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The Rigidity of Prices
ABSTRACT
Thispaper presents evidence on the amount of price
rigidity that exists in individual transaction prices.
Using the Stigler-Kindahi data, I examine the behavior of
individual buyers' prices for certain products used in manu-
facturing. My most important findings are:
1. The degree of price rigidity in many industries is
significant. It is not unusual in some industries for
prices to individual buyers to remain unchanged for several
years.
2.Even for what appear to be homogeneous commod-
ities, the correlation of price changes across buyers is
very low.
3.There is no evidence that there is an asymmetry in
price rigidity. In particular, prices are not rigid down-
ward.
4.The fixed costs of changing price at least to some
buyers seem trivial. There are plenty of instances where
small price changes occur.
5.The level of industry concentration is strongly
correlated with rigid prices. The more concentrated the
industry, the longer is the average spell of price rigidity.
6.There appears to be a relationship between price
rigidity, size of price change, and the length of time a
buyer and seller deal with each other.
I interpret the findings as evidence that it is errone-
ous to focus attention on price as the exclusive mechanism
to allocate resources. Nonprice rationing is not a fiction,
it is a reality of business and may be the efficient
response to economic uncertainty.
DennisW. Canton




Economists focus on price as a mechanism to allocate
resources efficiently. It is well recognized that ineffi-
cient resource allocation could occur if prices are not free
to adjust. Much of macroeconomics relies on some, usually
unexplained, source of price rigidity to generate ineffi-
cient unemployment. And in industrial organization there is
a large literature on "administered" prices which fail to
respond to the forces of supply and demand. Recently, there
have been several attempts to develop a theory to explain
why efficient resource allocation requires price to be
unchanging or "rigid" (Carlton, Hall, Williamson). Whether
or not price rigidity is efficient, one common conclusion
emerging from models with price rigidity is that markets
with rigid prices behave very differently than markets with
flexible prices. Therefore, an important unanswered ques-
tion is just how rigid are prices. Despite the great inter—
est in this question, there have been virtually no attempts
to answer it with data on individual transaction prices.
The purpose of this paper is to present evidence on the
amount of price rigidity that exists in individual
transaction prices. Previous studies of price rigidity have
relied almost exclusively on an examination of aggregate
price indices collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS).1 The use of ELS data has been strongly criticized
1. Research on prices includes the early and important work
of Mills (1926), Means (1935), and more recently Stigler
and Kindahi. (1973) and Qualls (1978).-2-
on the grounds that the ELS data are inaccurate measures of
transaction prices. Stigler and Kindahi sought to remedy
this deficiency by collecting price data on actual trans-
actions. Stigler and Kindahl then showed that price indices
of average transaction prices were more flexible than the
BLS price indices.
The difficulty with using indices is that they can mask
the behavior of individual transaction prices. For example,
suppose that two persons buy varying amounts of commodity A
monthly for many years. Suppose that each buyer pays a con-
stant price on each transaction for a period of several
years, that when the price to one buyer changes the price to
the other buyer is unaffected and that the price rigidity
that exists is more pronounced for a downward price move-
ment. All of these facts could be perfectly consistent with
a flexible aggregate price index as long as the amount pur-
chased by each buyer varies from month to month. Yet the
implication that many draw from a flexible price index,
namely that price is allocating resources efficiently, could
be completely inappropriate. Moreover, there are several
interesting questions that cannot be answered by examining
aggregate price indices. For example, how long do prices to
a buyer remain unchanged, what is the relationship between
contract length and price rigidity, and how closely together
do the prices to different buyers move?
Using the Stigler-Kindahl data, I have examined the
behavior of individual buyers' prices for certain products
used in manufacturing. My main conclusions are:-3—
1. The degree of price rigidity inmany industries is
significant. It is not unusual in some industries for
prices to individual buyers to remain unchanged for several
years.
2. Even for what appear to be homogeneous commodities,
the correlation of price changes across buyers isvery low.
3. There is a (weak) negative correlation between
price rigidity and length of buyer-seller association. The
more rigid are prices, the shorter the length of associ-
ation.
4. There is a positive correlation between price
rigidity and average absolute price change. The more rigid
are prices, the greater is the price change when prices do
change.
5. There is a negative correlation between length of
buyer-seller association and average absolute price change.
The longer a buyer and seller deal with each other, the
smaller are the average price change when prices do change.
6. There is no evidence that there is an asymmetry in
price rigidity. In particular, prices are not rigid down-
ward.
7. The fixed costs of changing price at least to some
buyers seem trivial. There are plenty of instances where
small price changes occur.
8. There is at best very weak evidence that buyers
have systematic preferences across products for unchanging
prices.-4-
9.The level of industry concentration is strongly
correlated with rigid prices. The more concentrated the
industry, the longer is the average spell of price rigidity.
The most startling finding to me is the very low corre-
lation of price changes for homogenous products across buy-
ers. Some of the theories referred to earlier explain why
this is likely to occur, especially for specialized goods.
The fact that it occurs for what most economists (though not
necessarily businessmen) would regard as a homogeneous prod-
uct emphasizes how erroneous it is to focus attention on
price as the exclusive mechanism to allocate resources.
Nonprice rationing is not a fiction, it is a reality of
business and may be the efficient response to economic
uncertainty. See Canton (Forthcoming).
Two general caveats deserve mention. First, a fixed
price contract for a fixed quantity creates no economic
inefficiency in the standard competitive model.If prices
change subsequent to the signing of the contract, the buyer
incurs a capital gain or loss but his marginal price remains
the same as every other buyer as long as the product can be
readily bought and sold. However, if either the buyer can-
not readily resell his product or if the buyer does not have
a fixed quantity contract, then a fixed price may well lead
to buyers facing different marginal prices. My understand-
ing of the data I use is that the contracts typically leave
the quantity unspecified, so that different buyers paying
different prices do indeed face different marginal prices.
Although this is inefficient in the standard competitive—5—
model, it need not be under more realistic assumptions that
recognize the cost of making a market. But the finding of
different prices and price movements to different buyers
does emphasize the inadequacy of the simple market clearing
model.
Second, the time period I examine is one with relative-
ly low levels of inflation and therefore I have made no
adjustment for it. However, even if inflation were rampant
and all prices indexed so that no (nominal) price rigidity
existed, the main conclusion of the paper would stand. The
conclusion is that price alone is not allocating goods and
that theories are required to justify what looks like non-
market clearing behavior.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the Stigler-Kindahi data and discusses measures of
price rigidity. Section III analyzes the characteristics of
price rigidity found in several general product groupings.
Section IV investigates the relationship between price
rigidity, price change and length of buyer-seller associ-
ations. Section V examines whether buyers have systematic
preferences for price stability across different products.
One criticism of using broadly defined product groups as the
unit of analysis is that there is so much heterogeneity of
products within a single product grouping that results can
be biased. Therefore, in Section VI, I redo the analysis
for a select group of narrowly defined products. Section
VII shows how to measure whether the prices to different
buyers move in concert and classifies the various products-b-
according to how similar are price changes to different buy-
ers. Section VIII examines some specific implications the
results have for the prediction of price behavior. Section
IX examines whether there is any relationship of the various
characteristics of price movements to the industry's struc-
tural characteristics. Section X presents the conclusion.
II. The Stigler-Kindahi Data
George Stigler and James Kindahi collected data mainly
from buyers on actual transaction prices paid for a variety
of products. They tried to correct for any explicit or
implicit discounting and for any changes in the specifica-
tions of the product. Although there is undoubtedly some
misreporting of prices, it is the most accurate and compre-
hensive data I know of on individual transaction prices.
The buyers who report prices are typically firms in the
Fortune 500. The identity of the seller is not known. Typ-
ically, there is only scant information on quantity pur-
chased, though it is believed that during the course of the
reporting buyers were using the product regularly. Ideally,
actual transaction prices are reported monthly. However, in
several instances, prices are reported less frequently. A
decision on how (or whether) to interpolate prices had to be
made.
If the price was unchanged between reportings, I
assumed that the intervening price was also unchanged. If
the price was not the same, then I created two different-7—
series. One method assumed a change in each unobserved
month. The other assumed only one change over the entire
period. For example, suppose that for January, the price is
$10, and for April, it is $20 with missing reports for Feb—
ruary and March. The first interpolation approach assumes
that the price was $13.30 in February and $16.60 in March
(i.e., linear interpolation), while the second interpolation
approach assumes that the price changed to $20 in either
February, March or April. (It turns out that our results on
length of rigidity are unaffected by which particular month
we assume for the price- change in this second approach.)
The period of observation is January 1, 1957 through
December 31, 1966. Few associations between buyers and
seller last for the entire 10 year period, a point which we
analyze later on. Transactions often take place under "con-
tract" and the length of the contract (e.g., semi-annual,
annual) is indicated. Appendix I provides information on
the frequency of use of each type of transaction. Many con-
tracts specify neither a price nor quantity. They seem not
to be binding legal documents but rather more like agree-
ments to agree.
The commodities chosen for study were preselected by
Stigler and Kindahi to contain many that others had claimed
were characterized by inflexible prices. The commodities
are intermediate products used in manufacturing. Within
broad commodity classes, finer product distinctions are
made. So, for example, one can examine the general category
of steel or a specific product category like carbon steel-8-
pipe less than 3 inches in diameter. Even within fine
product specifications, the individual transactions will
probably not involve perfectly homogeneous goods. There-
fore, I never compare absolute price levels across products
but instead look only at percentage changes in price and.
compare movements in percentage changes in price across
buyers.
There are a few instances where price series are
believed to be list prices, and those prices have been
excluded from the analysis. Also excluded are price series
that contain inconsistent information. For example, a
series is excluded if the reporter claims to produce prices
through 1965 but instead prices only through 1960 appear.
For several transactions, the product undergoes a specifica-
tion change. When this occurs, I treat the prices under the
new specification change as a new transaction.
III. Analysis of Product Groups
Table 1 describes the price rigidity present in the
individual transaction prices by product group. The first
column in Table 1 lists the type of product purchased. The
second column lists the number of buyer-seller pairings that
are observed for goods of unchanged specification. (One
pairing could last anywhere from 1 month to 10 years.) The
third column lists the average duration of price rigidity.
This last figure is computed as the average length of spell



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































observationson monthly price were $5, $5, $5, $6, $6, $7,
$7, $7, $7, there would be an average rigidity of 3 months.
The procedure for calculating an average rigidity actually
involves an underestimate since the price before our period
of observation may have been $5 and the price after our
period of observation may have been $7. Calculations
including and excluding the beginning and ending spells were
done with no material change in the substantive interpreta-
tion of the results. We have reported in Table 1 calcu-
lations based on the second method of interpolation of
prices (only one price change between missing observations -
seeprevious section) and have included the beginning and
the end of each price series. The fourth column reports the
standard deviation in the rigidity of prices. The fifth
column reports the same estimate of price rigidity as in
column (3) except that only 'monthly" contract series are
used. These series have fewer missing observations than the
other types of transactions, hence much less interpolation
is needed. If the implication of the numbers in column (3)
across commodities differ greatly from those in column (5),
one might be suspicious of the interpolation used in column
(3). We expect price flexibility of monthly contracts to
exceed that of all other contract types, so column (5)
really puts a lower bound on column (3).
To avoid misinterpretation of the results, it may be
helpful to review a standard issue in duration analysis.
Imagine that there are two observed transactions, each last-
ing for a one year period and each involving the same size— 11—
ofmonthly purchase. The first transaction involves a dif-
ferent price each month, while the second involves the same
price each month. There are 13 spells of rigidity, 12 of
which last one month and one of which lasts 12 months.
Based on spells, the average rigidity is 2413 or 1.8
months with 92% of the spells lasting one month and 8% last-
ing twelve months. Conditional on a price change just hav-
ing occurred, the average time to the next price change is
1.8 months. Yet, one half of all goods sold involve a rigid
price over the entire period. In other words, holding
monthly purchases constant, the analysis based on spells
underestimates the fraction of goods sold with rigid prices.
The results in columns (3) and (5) utilize spells data.
Even though I have no quantity information, I expect based
on the foregoing reasoning that this analysis underestimates
the fraction of goods sold at rigid prices.
In column (6), I calculate price rigidity using a
transaction as the unit of analysis, not a "spell." For
each transaction, I calculate the average price rigidity,
and then take an average (with each transaction weighted
according to its length) over all transactions. Return to
the earlier example of two transactions, each lasting one
year, but one involving 12 price changes and the other no
price changes. An analysis based on transactions (not
spells) would calculate average rigidity to be 1 +12or 6.5
2
months. It is that type of calculation that is reported in
column (6).- 12-
Severalinteresting facts emerge from Table 1.In
several industries, prices are on average unchanged over
periods exceeding one year. The degree of price inflexibil-
ity varies enormously across products groups. Steel, chemi-
cals and cement have average rigidities exceeding one year
while plywood and non-ferrous metals have average price
rigidities of less than five months. For any one product
group the standard deviation of rigidity is quite high. In
fact the standard deviation tends to rise as the average
duration of rigidity rises. The simple correlation and the
Spearman Rank Correlation between the standard deviation and
the average duration (columns (3) and (4)) are both above
.80. This suggests (though does not prove) either that each
product group presented in Table 1 contains heterogeneous
products which differ widely in their price flexibility or
that for even a homogeneous product a great heterogeneity in
price flexibility is present.2
Column (5) shows that using monthly contracts rather
than all contracts does not change the basic implications of
column (3) regarding relative price rigidity across groups.
Column (6) shows that, as expected, the average of price
rigidity rises when the unit of analysis is a transaction.
Indeed, the results of column (6) are striking in that they
show that every product group has an average rigidity in
2. An alternative explanation is that price movements for
the same product are similar across different trans-
actions at any one instant but not across time. As we
will see in Section VII, this explanation will turn out
to be incorrect.— 13—
excessof roughly 6 months, and that 6 of the 11 product
groups have average rigidities of roughly one year or more.
In Table 2, more detailed evidence is provided on the
time pattern of price rigidity by product group for three
types of transactions. The three transaction types are
monthly, in which case the transaction occurred monthly
(with no necessary future commitment), quarterly monthly in
which case the transaction was monthly but was reported
quarterly, and annual in which case the transaction was- pur-
suant to an annual contract. For most product groups, these
three types of transactions account for well over 60 percent
of all transactions. (See Appendix 1 for a breakdown by
product of the various types of transactions that comprise
the sample.) One important point to note about these trans-
actions is that an annual "contract" rarely means a price
change every 12 months, nor does a monthly "contract" mean a
price change every month. Although annual contracts do
involve more rigidity than monthly ones, it is incorrect to
think of "contracts" as inflexible price rules set at sped—
fled intervals. A more appropriate view is that they are
flexible agreements that can be renegotiated when and if the
need arises.
The results in Table 2 show that, as one would expect
from Table 1, the pattern of rigidity across product groups
is highly varied. As a general rule, all product groups for
each of the three transaction types in Table 2 are charac-
terized by spells of price rigidity that in the majority of









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































non-ferrousmetals and plywood are characterized by very
flexible prices with over 60% of all spells in the monthly
and quarterly-monthly category lasting less than three
months. On the other hand, there are definitely a substan-
tial number of transactions involving very inflexible
prices. For example, in steel, over 39% of the spells of
rigid prices in the annual and quarterly monthly category
(which comprises over half of all the transactions in steel)
last more than one year. Other commodities with important
transaction types showing fairly inflexible prices include
paper, chemicals, cement and glass.In fact, a histogram
analysis based on transactions (not spells) shows that 50%
or more of all transactions involving steel, paper, chemi-
cals, or glass, have average rigidities of one year or more.
As one would expect, the annual category involves less
price flexibility than the quarterly category which itself
exhibits less flexibility than the monthly category. It is
also interesting to note that even within a particular prod-
uct group and transaction type, there is a high degree of
heterogeneity in price flexibility. For example, for chemi-
cals monthly, over 50% of spells of rigidity are less than
three months, but still a significant fraction (10%) involve
spells of rigidity in excess of two years. This suggests
that either the products sold are different or, the buyer-
seller pairings have different properties, or the method- 16-
chosento allocate (i.e., price versus non-price) is simply
3 different.
One issue frequently raised in discussions of price
flexibility is the cost of making a price change (see, e.g.,
Barro (1972)). There are many types of costs associated
with a price change. New price sheets have to be con-
structed, price information must be conveyed to buyers, buy-
ers may find planning more difficult, buyers may distrust
sellers if prices change often, and so on. The real ques-
tion is how important are these costs. One way to address
this question is to see how important small price changes
are. Table 3 reports the percent of all price changes that
are less than 1/4%, 1/2%, 1% and 2% in absolute value for
the same product groups and transaction types reported in
Table 2.
Table 3 makes two points. First, very small price
changes occur more often in monthly than in quarterly month-
ly or in annual transaction types. Second, and most impor-
tant, there are a significant number of price changes that
one would consider small (i.e., less than 1%) for most com-
modities and transaction types. This finding presents a bit
of a puzzle if buyers are homogeneous. Either the cost of
changing price is small or the costs of being at the "wrong"
3. Alternatively, the heterogeneity in spells could arise
because supply and demand are changing over time. This
last explanation turns out not to provide the full
answer, as we shall see in Section VII. Moreover, a
table analogous to Table 2, based on transactions, not
spells, confirms the heterogeneity across transactions.TABLE 3
FREQUENCY OF SMALL PRICE CHANGES BY PRODUCT GROUP BY CONTRACT TYPE
Percent of PriceChanges less than Average
Product 1/4% 1/2% 1% 2% Price Change
(absolute value)
steel:
annual .04 .08 .11 .27 .033
quarterly .05 .11 .17 .24 .042
monthly .09 .20 .36 .52 .025
non-ferrous metals:
annual .02 .05 .09 .27 .070
quarterly .02 .05 .12 .25 .050
monthly .08 .15 .28 .49 .029
petroleum:
annual 0 0 .08 .24 .053
quarterly 0 0 .02 .17 .054
monthly .01 .05 .19 .47 .029
rubber tires:
annual .12 .21 .30 .44 .030
quarterly .07 .11 .18 .34 .045
monthly .13 .23 .38 .63 .023
paper:
annual .04 .09 .08 .27 .063
quarterly 0 .19 .24 .33 .036
monthly .13 .23 .43 .62 .020
chemicals:
annual .04 .08 .13 .24 .077
quarterly 0 .05 .11 .24 .073
monthly .05 .14 .30 .42 .050
cement:
annual .14 .22 .32 .46 .033
quarterly 0 0 .01 .19 .041
monthly .71 .75 .85 .94 .005
glass:
annual 0 0 .07 .19 .065
quarterly 0 0 .20 .40 .062
monthly .03 .20 .45 .67 .021
trucks, motors:
annual .03 .03 .12 .20 .039
quarterly 0 0 0 .08 .072
monthly .12 .27 .50 .75 .017plywood:
annual --
quarterly .01 .02 .06 .19 .061
monthly .19 .38 .54 .72 .019
household appliances:
annual 0 0 0 .25 .043
quarterly --
monthly .22 .44 .70 .95 .008--
price--evenone off by 1% --arevery high. Yet this
explanation would run into difficulties in explaining how it
can be that some transactions seem to involve prices that do
not change over long periods. Another explanation is that
perhaps price does not need to change in those transactions
for which prices are unchanging (i.e., neither supply nor
demand curves are shifting). This explanation runs into the
problem that, as is suggested from Table 2 (and as will be
confirmed later on), within the same product grouping there
are likely to be changing prices for one transaction at the
same time that there are constantprices for another. The
only possible explanations consistent with efficiency seem
to be either that firms differ in their allocation ability
with some firms relying on price more than others or alter-
natively that every firm must rely more on price when deal-
ing with certain buyers than with others.
The foregoing analysis can also shed light on the ques-
tion of whether there is an asymmetry in price movements.
For example, are prices rigid downward? If prices are rigid
downward, then one can think of the fixed cost of changing
price as being higher for price declines than price
increases. If so, the minimum positive price change should
be less than the minimum negative price change. In fact, an
analysis of minimum positive and negative price changes
reveals no such pattern.- 20-
IV.Relationship Between Price Rigidity,
Price Change, and Length of Buyer-Seller
Association
If within a particular product group, there is a wide
degree of heterogeneity in price rigidity across buyers, are
there any predictable correlations that emerge between price
rigidity, price change, and length of buyer-seller associ-
ation?4 There are several different theories ofprice
rigidity and the theories often have different implications
for these correlations. We now investigate three questions.
First, is there a positive correlation between length of
association and price rigidity across transactions for the
same product?5 That is, if buyer A has been dealing with
his seller for 10 years, while buyer B is beginning a new
relationship, are buyer A's prices more rigid? One ration-
ale for this relationship would be that if buyers and
sellers deal with each other over long time periods, they
set one average price and thereby save on the transaction
cost of changing price constantly. However, it is quite
possible to justify the reverse relationship. The
4. Length of association is measured as the total time the
buyer and seller have engaged in a transaction for a
product whose specifications may change over the time of
the association.
5. See Table 3A for data by product group on average length
of association, average duration of price rigidity and
average price change. Correlation of these three vari-
ables across product groups is not as good a way of
uncovering systematic relationships among these three
variables as is correlation of the three variables
across transactions for the same product because many
factors differ between product groups.- —
impedimentto changing price may be that the buyer or seller
may feel the other side is taking advantage of him (see
e.g., Williamson). If buyers and sellers have been dealing
with each other for a long period of time, it will be in
their interest not to take advantage of the other in the
short run for fear of damaging the ongoing relationship (See
e.g., Telser (1980)). If buyers and sellers know each other
well because of their long-standing relationship, this fear
of being taken advantage of in the short run will be
reduced. In such a case, flexible prices may emerge.
Second, is there an inverse correlation between the
size of price change and duration of price rigidity across
transactions within the same product group? That is, if
buyer A purchases steel on a contract in which price changes
frequently, while buyer B has a contract in which price
changes infrequently, are the price changes (when they
occur) of buyer A larger than those of buyer B? This
relationship would make sense if prices are rigid on some
transactions because there is a cost to changing price. If
so, one would expect that those transactions with the most
rigid prices (those to buyer B) have the highest costs of
changing price and therefore only large price changes will
be observed on those contracts. An alternative prediction
would be that some prices are rigid because buyers (or
sellers) want price stability for insurance-type reasons.
In such a case, price changes on the more rigid contract
could well be smaller than on the flexible price contract- 22-
sincethe function of insurance is to smooth out price fluc-
tuations.
The third question we examine is whether there is a
negative association between length of association and the
size of price change. If buyers' and sellers' distrust of
or lack of knowledge about each other explains rigid prices,
then the longer the association the lower the cost of chang-
ing price and hence the more flexible should be price and
the smaller the observed price changes. The opposite pre-
diction could emerge from a theory in which buyers and sell-
ers who deal with each other over long periods care about
getting only the average price right. In such a case, we
would expect to see rigid prices that infrequently change.
When they do change, they will change by larger amounts than
prices in less rigid contracts.6
Table 4 presents information to address these three
questions. Based on Table 4, the relationship between
length of association and rigidity is a bit ambiguous.
Annual contracts, which have the greatest rigidity, have the
shortest length of association. On the other hand, the
quarterly monthly contracts, which are more rigid than the
monthly contracts, tend to have slightly longer lengths of
association than the monthly contracts. Overall, the evi-
dence suggest that, to the extent a relationship exists, it
6.This assumes that price changes are motivated by changes
in the permanent price component whose changes are
assumed larger than the transitory component. The
reverse relation between permanent and transitory would
flip the prediction.TABLE 4














steel A 18.1 3.3 61
QM 17.4 4.2 119
M 9.4 2.5 105
non-ferrous A 9.9 7.0 83
metal QM 7.1 5.0 96
M 2.8 2.9 105
petroleum A 10.3 5.3 73
QM 4.1 5.4 88
2.5 2.9 94
rubber tires A 10.1 3.0 84
QM 10.6 4.5 116
7.8 2.3 119
paper A 13.7 6.3 76
Q'1 14.5 3.6 116
M 8.8 2.0 112
chemicals A 16.5 7.7 72
QM 14.0 7.3 119
M 9.6 5.0 91
cement A 13.7 3.5 88
QN 17.7 4.1 119
M 5.6 0.5 96
glass A 13.8 6.5 77
QM 13.9 6.2 118
N 8.5 2.1 96
trucks A 11.8 3.9 63
motors QM 8.4 7.2 115
N 3.7 1.7 113plywood A
5.9 5.9 114
M 1.2 1.2 120**
household A 14.2 4.3 52
appliances QM
M 2.5 0.8 108
annual, QM =quarterlymonthly, M =monthly.See Appendix 1 for
a description of the various types of transactions.
**There are only two contracts for monthly plywood series.- 25-
islikely to be a negative one. Longer associations lead to
more flexible prices.
The evidence between rigidity and size of price change
is clear in suggesting a positive link. Annual and quarter-
ly monthly contracts, both of which have more rigid prices
than monthly contracts, have much larger price changes than
monthly contracts.
The evidence between length of association and size of
price change is a bit ambiguous. Annual contracts, which
have larger price changes than monthly, have shorter lengths
of association than monthly. But, quarterly monthly con-
tracts, which have larger price changes than monthly, seem
to have about the same or longer lengths of association than
monthly. To the extent a relationship exists, the evidence
suggests a slight negative association between price change
and length of association.
The evidence in Table 4 is based on using contracts
grouped into one of three categories (annual, quarterly
monthly, monthly) and then seeing whether the annual con-
tracts which have the lowest frequency of change have, for
example, the longest buyer-seller association. An alterna-
tive to examining correlations across three subgroups is to
examine each contract individually and see whether length of
association, price change, and rigidity are correlated
across individual contracts.
Table 5 reports for each product group the corre-
lations, and indicates when they are statistically
significant at the 10% level (*),5%level (**) and 1% levelTABLE 5
CORRELATIONS OF CONTRACT CHARACTERISTICS
Correlation between:
Rigidity Length of
Length of & Average Association
Association Absolute & Average
& Price Absolute
Product Rigidity Change Price Change
Cement .28 .17 .24
Chemicals .l6' .10
Glass -.11 .69** -.24
Household Appliances .7l -.66
Non-Ferrous Metals .12 .12 -. l5
Paper .03 .20 - . 25
Petroleum - . 25** - .06 - .09
Plywood .10 .54' -.11
Rubber Tires - .08 -. 27
Steel .03 .14 .01
Trucks, Motors .60* -.23
Statistical significance at the 10% level indicated by ,5%level
level by *,and1% level by- 27
(***).Thereis clearly not a uniformly positive corre-
lation between length of association and rigidity within all
product groups. In fact, a strong positive association
exists only for chemicals, while a strong negative associ-
ation exists for petroleum, household appliances, and truck
motors. To the extent any relationship exists, it is a
ative one. The second column of Table 5 indicates that
there is a positive association between price change and
rigidity. All but one correlation is positive, and all
seven statistically significant correlations are positive.
The third column suggests that there is a negative corre-
lation between length of association and price change. All
but two correlations are negative, and all five statis-
tically significant correlations are negative.
In short, the evidence in Tables 4 and 5 is consistent
with the following explanation. Buyers and sellers who do
not have long associations are more likely to use fixed
price contracts because they donvt trust each other. The
"cost't of changing price on such a contract is to risk cre-
ation of mutual distrust. Prices change on these contracts
only for substantial price movements. Buyers and sellers
who have long associations aren't as worried abo'Lt-mutual
distrust. Hence, price changes are more frequent (i.e.,
less rigid prices) and on average smaller.7 There can, of
7. A model that would generate such results would be one
where costs are undergoing a random walk, production is
constant returns to scale, and the "cost" of changing
price is negatively related to length of association.- 28-
course,be other explanations for the results, but the one
just given seems to be most consistent with recent theo-
retical work surveyed earlier.
One common explanation for price (or wage) rigidity has
to do with insurance.I have not incorporated that explana-
tion into the one just given for several reasons. First,
recent work (e.g., Rosen) casts doubt on the theoretical
undergoings of an insurance explanation. Second, large
firms should be able to diversify such risks, and hence not
need insurance. Third, as we will see in the next sec-
tion, the insurance explanation does not seem supported by
the data.
V. Relationship Among Types of Transactions
Do some buyers seek out stable pricing arrangements in
which the price changes infrequently? If so, one would
expect to see a correlation in the rigidity of pricing
across transactions of different commodities. For example,
if the transactions of a particular buyer who purchased
steel involved price changing much less frequently than the
industry average, will it also be the case that the buyer's
transactions involving paper have prices that change less
frequently than the industry average?
For the product categories of Table 1, I have calcu-
lated for each buyer a vector of the average price rigidity
8. This must be qualified by agency theories of monitoring.- 29-
foreach of the commodities he purchases.I then examine
pairs of products to see if there is a correlation across
firms in these rigidities, (i.e., does a firm buying steel
with overly rigid prices buy paper with overly rigid
prices?). There are 227 buyer firms in my sample. There
are many fewer (almost 62) who purchase any two commodities.
The pairwise correlations were primarily positive, but in
most cases the correlations were not statistically signif-
icant and were often sensitive to the interpolation method
used to calculate price rigidity. The most stable and sta-
tistically significant results were the (positive) corre-
lations between price rigidity for contracts in steel and
rubber, metals and plywood and rubber, and cement.9
Because of the instability of the results, these results
should be regarded as at best weak support that buyers may
have certain preferences across transaction types for dif-
ferent products.
VI. Analysis of Specific Products
One drawback to the analysis of the previous sections
is that the product groups may be so broad that a
heterogeneity appears in the results which is caused only by
the heterogeneous nature of the products in any one commod-
ity group. To remedy this problem, an analysis of 32
9. One curious finding is that price rigidity is negatively
correlated at a statistically significant level for
truck and steel contracts.- 30-
specificproducts was performed. These 32 products were
chosen primarily because there were numerous data on them.
The products analyzed are listed in Table 6 along with
information similar to that presented in Table 1.
The results are similar to those of Table 1 in several
respects. As in Table 1, there is wide variation across
products in the rigidity of price. Even within a single
detailed product specification, there still exists a great
deal of heterogeneity in durations of spells of rigidity.
The standard deviation of duration rises with the average
duration.'° One is struck by therigidity of some
prices.Even for monthly contracts, there are many products
(e.g., chlorine liquid, steel plate) where the average
length of a spell of price rigidity is well over one year.
And, column (6) indicates that, using transactions as the
unit of analysis, most commodities have average durations of
price in excess of 8 months.
In Table 7 we present the histograms of price rigidity
by commodity for a frequently used contract specification.
The pattern that emerges is similar to that in Table 2.
Even within detailed product specification for a particular
contract type, there is considerable heterogeneity in length
of spells of price rigidity. This suggests that the price
of a good is changing for some transactions but not for
10. The simple and rank correlations of average duration and






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































HISTOGRAMS OF DURATIONS OF RIGIDITY BY DETAILED PRODUCT
BASED ON SPELLS OF RIGIDITY
Product! 0 -3 3Mo. -1 -2 2 -4 Over 4
Yrs. Transaction type* Mo. 1Yr. Yrs. s.
steel plate .24 .24 .23 .18 .11
hot rolled bars and rods .36 .21 .21 .16 .07
steel pipe and tubing .39 .31 .16 .10 .05
(less than diameter)
aluminum wire and cable .67 .30 .02 0 .01
(bare)
gasoline (regular)(A) .33 .59 .05 .03 0
diesel oil #2 .79 .22 0 0 0
fuel oil #2 (A) .03 .88 .08 .02 0
residual fuel oil #6 (A) .22 .64 .07 .06 0
container board- 0 .73 .19 .06 0
fiberboard (A)
caustic soda (liquid) (A) .10 .64 .14 .06 .06
chlorine liquid (A) 0 .69 .14 .10 .06
oxygen .32 .27 .14 .26 .01
acetylene .37 .24 .15 .21 .01
portland cement .19 .32 .24 .14 .05
(bag or sack)
steel sheet & hot .25 .27 .19 .21 .08
rolled strip
new rail .53 .07 .16 .06 .18
tie plates .53 .08 .17 .06 .16
steel wheels "one wear" .13 .35 .22 .22 .09
track bolts .27 .34 .23 .06 .11
zinc slat inst .44 .44 .09 .03 0
coal, for RR .60 .23 .11 .03 .03
kraft wrapping paper 0 .40 .40 .20 0
paper bags (no A either- .17 0 .67 .17 0
so used Mly)
sulfuric acid, bulk .68 .18 .08 0 .05
some type of sulfuric .13 .56 .20 .05 .05
acid (A)
methyl alcohol (A) .38 .38 .15 .07 .01
phthalic anhydride (Mly) .47 .41 .09 .03 0
succinate antibiotic 0 .30 0 .50 .20
kapseals antibiotic 0 .08 .08 .31 .54
meprobanate tablets (A) .14 .67 .11 .06 .03
librium (A) .13 .39 .22 .17 .09
plywood .73 .23 .03 .01 .01
missing .16 .33 .28 .20 .06
=annual,otherwise quarterly monthly.- 33—
others."Table 7 reveals that although most prices do
not remain in effect for over oneyear, for many products
(e.g., steel plate, hot rolled bars and rods,oxygen) a sig-
nificant number (over 15%) of spells of rigidprices remain
in effect for over two years.
In Table8, we present the fraction of pricechanges
that are less than 1/4%, 1/2%, 1% and 2% in absolute value
in order to assess the importance of the fixed costsof
changing price. Table 8 corroborates themessage of Table
3. For most products, there are numerous (over10%)
instances of small price changes (below 1%). This fact
reinforces my earlier conclusion that theories thatpostu-
late rigid prices solely because of high fixed costs of
changing price to any buyer are not supported by the evi-
dence. The most reasonable explanation is that firms and
buyers must differ in their need to rely on the price system
to achieve allocative efficiency.
An analysis of the minimum positive and negativeprice
changes reveals no tendency for one to exceed the other.
Just as in the earlier analysis, thereappears to be no evi-
dence to support asymmetric price changes.
In Tables 9 and 10, we present information,comparable
to Tables 4 and 5, to investigate the relationship between
price rigidity, length of association, and average price
change for transactions in the same product.(Table 4A in
11. Histograms like Table 7 based on a transactionas the
Unit of analysis confirms this.TABLE 8
FREQUENCY OF SMALL PRICE CHANGES
Percent of Price Changes less than
Product 1/4% 1/2%
0/ho 0'L,o
steel plate 0 1 11 16
hot rolled bars and rods 1. 8 13 28
steel pipe and tubing 4 6 14 27
(less than 3" diameter)
aluminium wire and cable 3 5 8 19
(bare)
gasoline (regular) (A) 0 1 13 27
diesel oil #2 0 0 2 19
fuel oil #2 (A) 0 0 7 22
residual fuel oil #6 (A) 0 0 2 25
container board- 4 4 4 12
fiberboard (A)
caustic soda (liquid) (A) 2 5 11 15
chlorine liquid (A) 6 13 17 31
oxygen 0 0 3 14
acetylene 0 10 18 23
portland cement 0 0 1 19
(bag or sack)
steel sheet and string, 0 2 7 13
hot rolled
newrail 1 3 6 10
the plates 3 5 5 9
steel wheels "one wear" 4 4 10 16
track bolts 1 3 14 16
zincslab ingots (M) 6 6 11 20
coal(RR) 3 8 18 37
kraft wrapping paper (M) 3 8 20 53
paperbags (N) 0 20 20 60
sulfuric acid, bulk 3 12 34 54 sulfuricacid (N) 1 1 57 76
methylalcohol (A) 0 15 24 32
phthahic anhydride 0 0 0 0
succinate antibiotic 0 0 0 0
kapseals antibiotic (A) 0 0 0 50
meprobonate tablets (A) 0 0 0 27
hibrium (A) Q 0 0 14
plywood 1 3 7 18
missing 0 0 3 5
All contracts are monthly, unless followed by an "A" which
indicates annual.TABLE 9
CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTRACTS BY TYPE
Average Duration
of a Spell of Average Length of
Price Rigidity Price ChangeAssociation
Product (months) (percent) (months)
1. Steel Plate (011400)
A 17.5 2.4 70
19.7 4.4 119.8
M 21.6 2.1 108
2. Hot Rolled Bars and Rods (01160)
A 18.0 2.7 72
QM 16.7 4.4 119.8
M 10.6 1.8 111
3. Carbonsteel Pipe (011710)
A
QM 13.4 5.0 118.5
M 12.7 2.7 95
4. Copper Wire and Cable, bare (022310)
A -- --
QM 4.7 5.2 58
N 2.6 2.2 82.5
5. Gasoline (031000)
A 8.9 4.6 81.3
-- - - - -
N 2.7 2.9 98.6
6. Diesel #2 (03200)
A 11.2 6.1 60.9
QM 3.7 4.6 118.6
ii 1.4 2.8 104
7. Fuel Oil #2 (03300)
A 11.8 5.1 69.7
QLM -- - - - -
N 4.6 4.1 104
8. Fuel Oil #6 (034000)
A 10.3 5.9 72.2
4.9 7.7 59
N 2.9 2.4 77
9. Corrugated Cartons (035010)
A 14.4 8.0 77
18.7 5.7 112
N 11.5 4.5 78.410. Caustic Soda, Liquid (061200)
A 16.9 7.7 85
QN - - - -
H 27.6 10.4 105
11. Chlorine, Liquid (061400)
A 17.5 4.6 86
QM
60.0 3.2 120
12. Oxygen Cylinders (061550)
A 16.0 12.1 96.1
QH 16.6 10.1 118.9
H 36.3 5.1 109
13. Acetylene (062115)
A 20.0 6.1 60
QM 15.2 7.0 18.8
14. kort1an Uement, in bag or sack (U/IUUU)
A 13.2 1.9 79.3
QM 17.6 4.1 118.6
H 60.0 0 60
15. Steel Sheet and Strip, Hot Rolled (011200)
A -- --
Qtl 18.6 5.9 119.9
H —— — —
16.New Rail (014500)
A
QM 22.5 3.9 115.5
H 17.1 3.4 120
17. Tie Plates (015000)
A --
QM 22.1 4.5 119.4
H 20.0 4.1 120
18. Steel Wheels "One Wear" (015500)
A -- --
QM 21.3 3.9 118.4
H 24.0 2.2 120
19. Track bolts (016030)
A -- --
QM 16.8 4.4 118.7
H 4.4 3.3 120
20. Zinc Slab Ingot (023200)
A --
QH 6.9 6.3 118
4.4 4.5 12021. Coal for RR (02600)
A -- -- --
QM 8.8 4.5 119.2
M 1.4 1.4 120
22. Kraft Wrapping Paper (053020)
A 21.6 10.9 108
QM -- - - - -
H 5.7 2.1 120
23. Paper Bags (053040)
A
QM -- - - - -
H 20.0 2.4 120
24. Sulfuric Acid, bulk (061100)
A 16.8 6.6 100.5
QM 9.1 2.5 115
H 7.3 78
25. Some type of Sulfuric Acid (061110)
A 17.0 5.9 104
QM -- - -
5.1 2.0 111.5
26. Methyl Alcohol (062500)
A 10.4 6.5 93.9
QM
-- - - - -
H 17.4 10.4 91.5
27. Phthalic Anhydride (064110)
A
QM -- - - - -
H 6.8 10.9 103.2
28. Succinate Antibotic (064110)
A 35.4 8.5 44.3
QM -- -- - -
H 57.0 29.3 85.5
29. Kapseals Antibiotic (064120)
A 58.5 7.6 69.1
QM - - - -
N 40.0 29.3 80
30. Neprobanate tablets (065100)
A 13.0 10.7 52.1
QM - - - - - -
H 40.0 29.3 8031. Librium (065200)
A 19.7 10.7 50.2
QM -- - - - -
56.0 56
32. Plywood (120000)
A -- -- --
QM 4.7 6.0 109
M 1.1 2.8 120
33. Missing (130000)
A -- -- --
QM 18.4 6.2 59.5
10.0 1.8 80TABLE 10












Product and Rigidity Change Price Change
Steel Sheet & Strip, -.40*
Hot Rolled (011200)
Steel Plate (011400) .07 -.11 .27
Hot Rolled Bars & Rods -.00 .32* .26
(011600)
Carbonsteel Pipe (011710) -.21 .19 _.32*
Plywood (120000) .10 .04
Nissing(130000) -.34 .14 -.26
New Rail (014500) .14 .41* -. 64
Tie Plates (015000) -- . 47 --
SteelWheels "OneWear" .07 -.33 -.14
(015500)
Track Bolts (016030) -- 54** --
CopperWire & Cable, -.06 .76' -.20
bare(022310)
Coal for RR (02600) -- -.14 --
Gasoline(031000) .02 .03 -.02
Diesel #2 (03200) -.74' -.22 .27
FuelOil #2 (03300) -.20 -.31 .60*
Fuel Oil #6 (034000) -.12 .02 -.14
Sulfuric Acid, bulk .5l -.06 -
(061100)
Sulfuric Acid (061110) _.52*** .15 .10
Caustic Soda, Liquid .35 .58*** .22
(061200)
Chlorine, Liquid (061400) .40* -.00 -
OxygenCylinders (061550) .10 -.17 .07
Acetylene (062115) .04 .5Oth .12
Nethyl Alcohol (062500) .21 •53* .02
Portland Cement, in .34 .19 .33
bag or sack (071000)
Significance at 10% indicated by ,5%by 1%by '*- 40-
theAppendix presents information by product on average
price change and average length of association.) Table 9
suggests a positive correlation between price change and
rigidity. Monthly contracts, which often have the lowest
rigidity, have the smallest price changes. The evidence on
the correlation between rigidity and length of association
and on price change and length of association is less clear.
The ambiguity arises because monthly contracts typically
have less rigid prices, longer lengths of association and
smaller price changes than annual contracts, but shorter
lengths of association, larger price changes and less rigid
prices than quarterly monthly contracts.
A detailed correlation analysis for each product is
presented in Table 10 for those commodities with at least 10
transactions.'2 The results mirror those of Table 5.
There is, at best, a negative correlation between rigidity
and length of association. Of the 20 correlations, only 4
were statistically significant. Two negative correlations
were significant at the 1% level, while the positive corre-
lations were significant at the 5 and 10% levels.(However,
the number of positive correlations exceeded the number of
negative ones.) The evidence on the correlation between
price change and rigidity is clearer. Of the nine signif-
icant correlations, eight were positive. The number of
positive correlations exceeded the number of negative ones.
The evidence on the correlation between price change and
12. Most correlations involve between 20 to 30 observations.- 41-
lengthof association indicates a negative correlation. Of
the six significant coefficients, five were negative. The
number of negative correlations exceeded the number of posi—
tives.
VII. The Heterogeneity of Price Movements
Across Buyers
The previous evidence reveals that price movements
across different transaction types for the same commodity
may be very different. In this section we investigate in
more detail the heterogeneity of price movements for the
same commodity. By limiting the analysis to transactions of
the same type, we have automatically screened out consider-
able heterogeneity. Despite this, we will still find a
startling amount of heterogeneity. We limit our analysis to
annual contracts or quarterly monthly and monthly contracts,
depending on the available data. We group price movements
from quarterly monthly and monthly together on the grounds
that they both represent price series whose prices are not
necessarily expected to remain in force for more than one
month.
We use two methods to describe how heterogeneous price
movements are. The first method measures the difference in
the stochastic structure of each price change series while
the second attempts to measure correlation in price move-
ments across different transactions.- 42-
Thefirst method computes for each individual price
series the variance in the percent changes in price (actual-
ly the first difference of the log of the price series). A
variance 02 15 computed for each transaction price series.
If all the price series have the same stochastic structure
this variance should be the same across different price
series for the same commodity. For each of the 30 commod-
ities, we present the mean variance (i.e., the mean of
02) the variance of 2 (i.e., a measure of how o
varies across transactions), and the coefficient of vari-
ation (square root of variance of 02 divided by the mean).
Table 11 shows that in general the individual price
series within any one commodity and transaction type seems
to be quite different from one another. The commodities
that seem to have the least homogeneous transactions are
carbon steel pipe, oxygen, sheet steel, steel railway
wheels, and coal.
Another method of characterizing the degree of
heterogeneity among price series is to look at the corre—
lation of contemporaneous price changes. A slight extension
of this method is to examine the correlation of filtered
price series. An example will illustrate.
Suppose two monthly price series are
10 10 10 10 5 5 5 57.5 7.5 7.5 7.5, and
10 10 105 5 5 5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5
One might be especially interested in seeing how closely theTABLE 11
MEASURES OF HETEROGENEITY AMONG PRICE SERIES
Mean VarianceVariances of
of Individual Individual
Price Change Price Change Coefficient
Product Series Series of Variation
steel plate 1.3310-6 1.5610-9 29.7
hot rolled bars 1.7310-6 3.6410-9 34.9
and rods
carbonsteel pipe 3.3110-6 2.2710-8 45.5
wire and cable, bare 1.4510-5 4.3610-8 14.4
gasoline 6.2210.5 1.0310-6 16.3
diesel #2 1.5910—5 6.5010-8 16.0
fuel oil #2 (A) 2.9310-5 1.0210-7 10.9
fuel oil #8 2.5710-5 4.5410-7 26.2
corrugated cartons 2.9410-5 5.6210-9 2.5
caustic soda 5.2610-5 4.8910-8 4.2
liquid chlorine (A) 8.4810-6 6.5710-8 30.2
oxygen 3.0710-5 2.4910-6 51.4
acetylene 6.6610-6 4.6310-8 32.3
portland cement 1.9710-6 4.7910-9 35.1
sheet steel & strip 4.6410-6 1.6310-7 87.0
(hot rolled)
new rails 9.9510—7 1.4410-10 12.1
tie plates 1.5510-6 1.4310-10 7.7
steel railway wheels 9.5110-7 8.0810-9 94.5
railroad track bolts 2.8710-6 4.9310-9 24.5
zinc slab, ingot 6.2110-5 7.0910-8 4.3
coal R.R. 9.1510-6 1.6010-7 43.7
sulfuric acid, bulk (A)5.9210-5 1.9110-6 23.3
sulfuric acid (A) 5.5410-5 9.0510-7 17.2
methyl alcohol(A) 7.2410-5 1.55107 5.4
phthalic anhydride 2.7810-4 1.5210-6 4.4
succinate (A) 5.4210-6 3.1310-8 32.6
kapseals (A) 2.5210-6 2.7710-9 20.9
meprobanate tablets (A)2.5910-4 3.8310-6 7.6
librium (A) 6.3910-5 5.4010-7 11.5
plywood 2.0810-5 1.4310-7 18.2
unknown 5.0710-6 3.3310-8 36.0- 44-
percentchanges in the price series are correlated. The two
derived series of percent price changes are
-00 0-50% 0 0 050% 0 0 0
-00 -50% 00 0 50% 00 0 0
It appears that the two series have no correlation in per-
cent changes. But that conclusion is misleading. Both
series change within one month of each other. Suppose that
we construct a new series that takes the arithmetic average
of the last two monthly percent changes in price. Then we
obtain two series that look like
-- 0 0-25% -25% 0 025% 25% 0 0
-- 0-25% -25% 00 25% 25%00 0
The correlation now will be positive and will equal .5.If
we use a three month filter (i.e., average over the last
three monthly percent changes in price), the correlation
rises to .67. In general, we initially expect correlation
to rise as the period of averaging increases (provided price
changes within one price series are serially uncorrelated).
Before presenting tabulations of correlations by prod-
uct for different filter sizes, it will be helpful first to
decide what is a "high't or "low" correlation. In other
words, we must develop some underlying standard as to how
closely two very related series should move. Suppose we
adopt the position that two price series that change by- 45 -
identicalamounts within, say, 3 months of each other are
"highly" correlated. Let p(F) be the contemporaneous cor-
relation of the two price series when averaging over F
periods is performed. Suppose that the two series repre-
senting percent price changes are identical, are displaced
from each other by three months, and that price changes are
independent of the preceding price change. Then, it is easy
to show that
p(l)= p(2) = 0
p(F)1—3/F F >3.
Thismeans that for a filter of size 6, the correlation
between our two series is .5, and rises to .75 for filters
of one year.In general, we should expect that very high
correlations (above .7) will probably be unusual for filters
below 12 months, even for "well behaved" price series.
Each of 30 products was analyzed separately.'3 For
each product, and for each contract type an average corre-
lation for a particular filter size was computed. For exam-
ple, suppose that there are 10 individual contract
transactions for steel plates, each lasting 10 years. The
monthly percent change in price (difference in log of price)
was calculated for each series for each month. The simple
correlation was computed for every combination of contracts
(i.e., 45 pairs) and an average correlation over the 45
pairs was then computed. If the average correlation is
13. Some products from Table 9 were dropped because of data
incompleteness.- 46-
high,it says that on average the price series move togeth—
er. If the average correlation is low, it suggests that
price movements for the same good are only very loosely
related to each other.If the low correlation persists as
the filter increases to say 2 years, it says that knowing
how person A's price has changed over a two year period
doesn't help much in predicting how person B's price will
change (averaged over the two year period).
In Table 12, I present measures of average correlation
for filters of 1 month and 12 months for each of the 30 com-
modities for selected contract types.'4 As expected,
p(12) usually exceeds p(l).If we use the criterion
that correlations on the order of .5 and above represent
price series that move pretty closely together, we see that
for several products there is a homogeneity of price move-
ments. On the other hand, there are several products like
fuel oil no. 2, corrugated cartons, plywood, and several
chemical products that have very low (sometimes even nega-
tive) correlations even for 12 month averaging. In fact, it
is startling to find so many products where it is clear that
some mechanism other than price is allocating resources.'5
It is noteworthy that corrugated cartons exhibit low
14. Filters of 2 years produced results similar to those for
filters of 1 year. Correlations were also calculated on
the timing of price changes (i.e., 0 or 1 indicating
whether or not a price change occurred) and the same low
correlations persisted.
15. Carlton (1979) presents a theory on buyer heterogeneity,
which shows how prices to different buyers can exhibit
low (or negative) correlations.TABLE 12
HETEROGENEITY MEASURES:
CORRELATIONS AMONG PRICE SERIES
Product p(l) p(l2)
steel plate .42 .61
hot rolled bars and rods .42 .60
carbon steel pipe .16 .25
wire and cable .53 .78
gasoline (A) .02 .07
(M) .04 .30
diesel fuel #2 (A) .001 .06
(M) .53 .69
fuel oil *2 (A) .006 -.03
fuel oil #6 (A) .02 .11
(M) .26 .49
corrugated cartons (A) .14 -.03
(M) .06 .16
caustic soda (A) .07 .07
(M) .04 .36
licniid chlorine (A) .05 .08
oxygen (A) .03 .17
(M) .28 .40
acetylene (M) .30 .54
portland cement (M) .15 .21
sheet steel (M) .40 .44
rails (M) .81 .94
tie plates (N) .78 .88
steel railway wheels .37 .54
railroad track bolts .47 .62
zinc slab (M) .52 .90
coal (RR) (M) .14 .17
phthalic anhydride (N) .27 .68
sulfuric acid, bulk (A) .13 .32
sulfuric acid (A) .10 .07
methyl alcohol (A) .22 .46
succinate (A) *0.0 *0.0
kapseals (A) *0.0 *0.0
meprobanate tablets (A) .03 -.07
librium (A) -.02 -.06
plywood (N) .16 .21
Notes: A -annualcontract
N -Pricesfor monthly and quarterly monthly
transactions.
p(i) -Correlationsof price changes averaged
over i months.
*- Nopricemovement in most contracts.- -
correlationsof price, since it is known that quantity
rationing is frequently used in the paper industry in place
of price rationing.
It is interesting to see whether there is any agreement
between the two methods of characterizing heterogeneity in
Tables 11 and 12.In fact, there is a low degree of agree-
ment. The simple correlation between the measures of
heterogeneity in Tables 11 and 12 is below .1 and is not
statistically significant. On the other hand, there is a
high degree of statistically significant (negative) corre-
lation between p(l) (or p(12)) and other measures of
heterogeneity such as the coefficients of variation for
rigidity, price change and length of association. This may
imply that the measure in Table 11 is capturing an aspect of
price different from the other measures or alternatively
that the measure in Table 11 is not a useful one)6
VIII. Implications for Price Behavior
Tables 1 through 12 contain a wealth of predictable
implications. For example, one could predict the following:
1. The products with high correlations for p(12) in
Table 12 should tend to have more serial correlation in
their annual WPI component than products with low corre-
lations,
16. Table 5A reports these correlations.- 49-
2.Industry-wide price adjustment for products with
high values for p(l) in Table 12 should tend to be swift,
3. Price controls on products with long spells of
rigid prices (Table 1) are less likely to have harmful effi-
ciency effects than controls on products with short spells
of rigidity because non-price methods are probably already
used for products with very rigid prices to allocate
resources.
I have not systematically investigated these three
claims for each of the products listed in Table 12. How-
ever, I have done some work (based on available data) to
corroborate at least some of the claims for some products.
For example, from Table 12 diesel fuel has a p(l2) of .69
while gasoline has a p(l2) of only .30. The first- order
serial correlation in the WPI for diesel fuel is .70 which,
as expected, exceeds that same measure for gasoline (the
first-order serial correlation of the WPI for gasoline is
.26).
Bordo (1980) has estimated adjustment lags in prices
for some of the commodity groups well represented in Table
12, such as metals and metal products, chemicals and fuel.
Based on the size of p(l) in Table 12, I would predict the
speed of adjustment to be fastest in metals and metal
products, and the speed of adjustment in fuels and chemicals
to be much slower and roughly equal to each other.In fact,
Bordo finds the mean lag of price adjustment for metals and
metal products to 3.66 months, while the lag for fuels and
chemicals are 6.64 and 6.20 months respectively.— 50-
Finally,the only evidence I could find on the diffi-
culty of price controls is Gaibraith's (1952) A Theory of
Price Control which is an account of his experience in con-
trolling prices during World War II when he headed The
Office of Price Administration (OPA). Although he does not
deal explicitly with all the products in Tables 1-12, he
does talk about metal products, which from Table 1 has a
high degree of rigidity. Galbraith states (p. 12) "It was
commonplace in early OPA experience that the primary metal
markets; where sellers are few, were relatively easy to con-
trol without formal allocation" and (p. 17) "The Office of
Price Administration controlled the price of all steel mill
products with far less manpower and trouble than was
required for a far smaller volume of steel scrap. .. itis
relatively easy to fix prices that are already fixed."
Although bits of evidence corroborate the predictions
for some types of commodities, they obviously are far from
conclusive. They do, however, show the value of evidence
like that in Tables 1 through 12.
IX. Structural Determinants of Price Behavior
Is there any correlation between industry character-
istics and any of the measures of heterogeneity such as
those in Tables 11 and 12 (and 5A)? Using 30 of the
products of Tables 11 and 12, I correlated the measures of
heterogeneity in price movements of Tables 11 and 12 with
the following variables:- 51-
1.mean absolute growth and variability of price
(the higher is this number the higher the
expected correlation of price movements)
2. measures of competitiveness
a) four firm concentration ratio
b) fraction of shipments beyond 500 miles.
3. growth and variability of total industry shipments.
4. length of buyer-seller association.
Simple correlations never emerged statistically signif-
icant (with the exception of the variance of the growth rate
in price), though the correlations were generally in the
positive direction. However, since only at most 21 observa-
tions were available (I separately analyzed monthly and
quarterly monthly, and annual contracts), it would be prema-
ture to conclude that these structural characteristics don't
influence price heterogeneity in the industry.
Is there any correlation between concentration and
duration of price rigidity or length of association or aver-
age price change? Using 30 of the products in Table 12, I
calculated each of those correlations. The only significant
correlation was between concentration (four firms) and dura-
tion of price rigidity. That correlation was statistically
significant at the 5% level and equalled .45. The corre-
lation implies that for every 10 point increase in the four
firm concentration ratio, prices remain rigid for an extra- 52-
1.5months.17 This finding is particularly interesting
because it suggests that allocations are performed differ-
ently in concentrated and unconcentrated markets.I believe
it is incorrect to draw the conclusions, implicit in the
work of Means, Burns, Gaibraith and others, that the markets
have stopped working when they become concentrated.
Instead, the proper interpretation is that as firms become
large they supplant the market's exclusive reliance on price
as an allocation device and resort to other methods. In a
world filled with transaction costs, exclusive reliance on a
market-generated price to allocate goods could well be infe-
rior to other non-price allocation methods. It is the case,
however, that markets that use non-price allocation will
respond to market shocks much differently than markets that
exclusively use price to allocate. See Carlton () fora
fuller development of this theory.
X. Conclusions
Since this paper began with a summary of the empirical
results, I will not repeat them here. The main conclusion
is that several of the empirical results are sufficiently
17. The OLS equation is
2
Av.Duration5.05 +15.43CR 4 R .25
(3.10) (5.76) SEE4.9
(standard errors in parenthesis)
where Av. Duration is the average length of a spell of
price rigidity and CR 4 is the four-firm concentration
ratio.— 53—
startlingthat we should reexamine the central o'ften exclu-
sive role assigned to the price mechanism in theories of
efficient resource allocation. It is not that the price
mechanism has failed, but rather that alternative allocation
mechanisms are used in addition to the price mechanism to
achieve efficiency.BIBLIOGRAPHY
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All transactions were classified into one of 10
categories by Stigler and Kindahl. Those classifications
were:
annual contract -contractin force for one year
annual average -averageof transaction prices
during the year -nocontract
annual monthly -annualobservations of a
transaction that occurs monthly
semi-annual contract -contractin force for six months
semi-annual average -averageof transaction prices
during six months -nocontract
quarterly contract -contractin force for three months
quarterly average -quarterlyobservation of a
transaction that occurs monthly
irregular -irregular
monthly -monthlyobservations of a
transaction that occurs monthly
Tables 1A and 2A report the importance of each





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Product Annual Monthly Monthly
Steel Plate .04 .82 .04
Hot Rolled Bars & Rods .03 .73 .18
Carbonsteel Pipe 0 .82 .09
Copper Wire & Cable, Bars 0 .54 .27
Gasoline .03 0 .08
Diesel #2 .19 .25 .04
Fuel Oil #2 .27 0 .07
Fuel Oil #6 .31 .31 .08
Corrugated Cartons .21 .04 .18
Caustic Soda, Liquid .48 0 .18
Chlorine, Liquid .75 0 .04
Oxygen Cylinders .23 .63 .03
Cetylene .05 .77 .14
Portland Cement-bar or sac .14 .71 .04
Steel Sheet & Strip,
Hot Rolled 0 1.00 0
New Rail 0 .90 .10
Tie Plates 0 .94 .06
Steel Wheels "one wear" 0 .96 .04
Track Bolts 0 .94 .06
Zinc Slat Ingot 0 .22 .44
Coal, for RR 0 .95 .09
Kraft Wrapping Paper .08 0 .17
Paper Bags 0 0 .06
Sulfuric Acid, Bulk .53 .20 .13
Some Type of
Sulfuric Acid .47 0 .26
Methel Alcohol .50 0 .28
Ithalic Anhydride 0 0 .60
Succinate Antibiotic .50 0 .13
Kapseals Antibiotic .69 0 .06
Meprobanate Tablets .63 0 .06
Librium .69 0 .08
Plywood 0 .96 .04
Missing 0 .94 .06TABLE 3A
CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTRACTS BY PRODUCT
Average Average
Length of Size of
Association Absolute Average
Between Value of Actual
Buyer and Price Change Price
Seller(Months) (percent) Change
Steel 105 3.5 .02
Non-Ferrous Metals 86 4.0 .01
Petroleum 87 4.4 -.01
Rubber Tires 98 3.9 0.0
Paper 91 3.4 .004
Chemicals 81 7.0 -.01
Cement 103 3.0 .02
Glass 91 4.2 .00
Truck Motors 82 2.7 .00
Plywood 114 5.0 .01TABLE 4A





Product (monthly) Change %
steel plates 108 3.8
hot rolled bars and rods 109 3.7
steel pipe and tubing 114 4.6
(3torless in diameter)
aluminum wire & cable 68 4.4
(bare)
gasoline (regular) 91 3.3
diesel oil *2 94 4.3
fuel oil *2 89 4.6
residual fuel oil *6 73 5.8
container board-fiber 78 5.2
board
caustic soda (liquid) 84 7.8
chlorine liquid 89 5.0
oxygen, cylinders 109 11.5
acetylene 116 6.9
portland cement (by sack) 104 3.7
steel sheet and strip, 120 5.9
hot rolled
new rail (R.R.) 116 3.9
tie plates (R.R.) 119 4.5
steel wheels "one wear" 119 3.8
(R.R.)
track bolts (R.R.) 119 4.2
zinc slab ingots 104 4.8
coal (R.R.) 119 3.7
kraft wrapping paper 94 4.3
paper bags 88 4.8
sulfuric acid, bulk 96 4.8
sulfuric acid 103 3.5
methyl alcohol 91 7.1
phthalic anhydride 93 11.7
succinate antibiotic 58 8.3
kapseals antibiotic 70 14.9
meprobanate tablets 64 12.1
librium 48 8.6
plywood 110 5.2TABLE 5A
CORRELATIONS AMONG MEASURES OF HETEREOGENEITY
CV DURCV DP CV ASSOC.CV VAR p(l) p(12)
CV DUR 1 .88* .41* -.03 -.63* -.60*
CV DP 1 35* 39 -57* -.66*
CV ASSOC. 1 .58* -30
CV VAR 1 .08 -.01
p(l) 1 .91*
p(l2) 1
Notes: CV IJUR =coefficientof variation of duration
CV DP =coefficientof variation of the absolute value
of price change (log difference)
CV ASSOC. =coefficientof variation of the length of
association
CV VAR =coefficientof variation of the actual price
changes counting no change as zero change
p(l),p(12) =seetext for explanation
significant at 5% level